

Minding our MANRS

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ESnet Customer Provisioning

- All customer prefixes are checked against RIR database
 - We do not accept a "Letter of Authorization"
- Prefixes entered into our database
- Provisioning is fully orchestrated
- BCP38 ACL's applied on interfaces
- explicit BGP import filters
- All customers MUST have route/route6 IRR objects and get included into ESnet's as-set



How do 3rd party networks find our prefixes?

aut-num: AS293

as-name: ESNET

descr: Energy Sciences Network

export: to AS-ANY announce AS293:AS-ESNET

admin-c: ESnet Network Engineering Group

tech-c: ESnet Network Engineering Group

notify: hostmaster@es.net

mnt-by: MAINT-ESNET

changed: dwcarder@es.net 20230915 #18:51:23Z

source: RADB



peeringdb.com

Energy Sciences Network (ESnet)

Organization	Energy Sciences Network (ESnet)
Also Known As	U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science
Long Name	
Company Website	http://www.es.net
ASN	293
IRR as-set/route-set ?	RADB::AS293:AS-ESNET
Route Server URI	



as-set: AS293:AS-ESNET

descr: AS Cone of ESnet

members: AS16, AS43, AS44, AS45, AS50, AS68, AS291,

AS292, AS293, AS377, AS513:AS-CERN-NREN, AS683, AS2640,

AS2936, AS2937, AS3152, AS3380, AS3425, AS3428, AS3424,

AS3431, AS3443, AS3445, AS3562, AS3671, AS3970, AS6406,

AS10702, AS11678, AS14702, AS16411, AS32982, AS36288,

AS46846, AS54297, AS62555, AS63331, AS396098, AS398900,

AS400066, AS-PEERING-TESTBED

tech-c: ESnet Network Engineering Group

mnt-by: MAINT-ESNET

changed: dwcarder@es.net 20230911 #16:15:51Z

source: RADB



> bgpq4 -A -6 AS293:AS-ESNET | wc -1



bgpq4 can automagically create filters

> bgpq4 -A -6 AS-ESNET

no ipv6 prefix-list NN

ipv6 prefix-list NN permit 2001:400::/32

ipv6 prefix-list NN permit 2001:67c:2c4::/48

ipv6 prefix-list NN permit 2001:7fb:fd02::/48

... and so on



json format:



Recently published our peering policy

https://www.es.net/engineering-services/the-network/peering-connections/

- Peer must have a publicly assigned Autonomous System Number (ASN) from a Regional Internet Registry (RIR).
- All prefixes announced must be publicly routable and properly registered with the corresponding RIR.
- Prefixes will be exchanged over BGP.
- Peer must maintain an AS-SET and keep up to date entries in the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) system for all prefixes announced.
 - Prefixes not registered in the IRR system will not be accepted.
 - Prefixes that are RPKI invalid will not be accepted.
- Peer must maintain an up to date PeeringDB entry, including a 24x7 NOC Contact, AS-SET, and prefix limits.
- Unless specifically agreed upon beforehand, peers are expected to peer in all locations where mutually
 present and announce a consistent set of prefixes at all locations.
- Peer must adhere to MANRS industry standards for route security, including BCP38 filtering of its customer cone.

Peer Network Provisioning

- AS Number, peer type, other bgp intent entered into database
- Orchestration process
 - Looks in PeeringDB for IRR object
 - calls bgpq4 to get prefixes (returned as json)
 - rpki-invalid prefixes are dropped
 - provisions explicit BGP import policy & prefix accept lists

Any prefix you send us not in the list is dropped!



In our Internet DFZ VRF (mix of commercial & R&E peers):

- 127 peer networks (non-customer)
- 110 have entries in PeeringDB

- What if a PeeringDB as-set entry doesn't exist?
 - we can statically configure the IRR object in our database
 - 8 networks only define their as-set in their aut-num object
 - 2 we figured out by inverse query of mnt-by records
 - or, just do lookup of RIR data (only works for stub asn's, though)
 - 2 networks fall into this category



THE "WALL OF SHAME"

Only 5 ESnet peers have no discernable IRR as-set object:

- NASA
- TWAREN
- CUDI
- TRANSPAC
- INTERNET2 <---- you are here



Why doesn't Internet2 have an as-set?

- Maybe nobody notices traffic taking commercial paths?
 - possibly, see Steve's talk about routing intent from Weds

- Maybe I2 doesn't care about routing security?
 - highly unlikely

- Maybe I2 doesn't know who their customers are?
 - highly unlikely



Maybe there's a lot of legacy stuff and it's just very very hard to make an as-set for Internet2?

- bazillion asn's
- connector networks
- regional networks
- state networks
- campuses
- k12's
- and so on



Maybe there's a lot of legacy stuff and it's just very very hard to make an as-set for Internet2?

FALSE



Maybe there's a lot of legacy stuff and it's just very very hard to make an as-set for Internet2?

FALSE

Proof: I created one!



I created an as-set for Internet2!

as-set: AS293:AS-FROM-I2-TO-ESNET

members: AS-CALREN2

members: AS-CARNE

members: AS-DARTMOUTH

members: AS-FLRnet-Aggregate

members: AS-FRGP

members: AS-GPN-PEERS

members: AS-ICCN

members: AS-INGIG

members: AS-KINBER

members: AS-LONI-members

... and on & on



Other recent example issues in R&E

- Backup paths and other special arrangements complicate things
 - GEANT sending ESnet extra R&E reachability
 - Some of it turned out to be a mistake
 - Some of it is intentional
 - ESnet, of course, drops all of these prefixes as unauthorized
 - NORDUnet's IRR object potentially missing entries
 - ESnet, of course, drops all of these prefixes as unauthorized

These issues cause asymmetry & complicate troubleshooting



It's time to get real about routing security

- R&E Networks do lag behind the commercial sector
 - even I2PX has an IRR object: AS11164:AS-ALL

lack of prefix filtering (GEANT)

lack of ROA's

With some motivation we can reap the benefits.





extra slides if we have additional time



Things ESnet still needs to improve #1

- Update prefix lists more regularly
 - Right now, we update filters ~quartery or as-needed
 - Need to do this way more regularly, like nightly
 - Waiting on a better way to safely run bulk automation jobs
- AS-Path filtering from customers
 - While we do filter prefixes, make sure they can only use their AS #'s
- Tier-1 as-path filtering from peers
 - Best practice: filter out paths where a "tier-1" is in the AS-PATH
 - ESnet does peers with quite a few of these, so this will take us some extra effort to add to our automation and not drop traffic



Things ESnet still needs to improve #2

- RPKI drop-invalid
 - validators are running, but need effort to add drop-invalid policy via provisioning automation
- Sign ROA's for our IPv4 prefixes
 - just submitted updated LRSA 9/20!!!
- Announce / sinkhole address space we use internal to DOE but does not appear on the external Internet
 - Some IP space looks "not in use" and attractive to steal
 - Maybe sign AS 0 ROA first, but it may be more interesting to capture traffic.

